Read a sample: 1. A Safe Place to Practice
The first indication of a ransomware incident may not look dramatic. An employee cannot open a familiar file. A shared folder responds unusually slowly. Someone mentions that a customer record appears to be missing, while another person says the system was working a few minutes ago.
None of those observations, by itself, tells a leadership team exactly what has happened. Yet someone may need to make a decision before the explanation is complete. Should staff keep working? Who can authorize a change to normal operations? What should employees be told while the organization investigates?
These are difficult questions to answer for the first time during a disruption. The pressure of an actual incident can make ordinary uncertainties feel urgent, and a small team may have only a few people available to investigate, communicate, and keep the business moving. A tabletop exercise gives those people an opportunity to practice together before the stakes are real.
This book provides a fictional ransomware scenario for that purpose. You will not need to attack a computer, disable a network, or restore a real backup. Instead, the team will receive information in stages, discuss what it knows, make decisions, and consider the consequences. The value is not in guessing the perfect answer. It is in discovering how the organization makes decisions when time, information, and attention are limited.
Ransomware is malicious activity in which an attacker attempts to pressure an organization for money, often by making files or systems inaccessible and demanding payment. An attacker may also claim to have taken information and threaten to release it. An incident can involve both disruption and possible data exposure, but the facts will vary. A demand or claim is not, by itself, proof of what the attacker has done.
The technical details matter, but leaders do not need to be specialists to understand the business problem. If the systems people rely on become unavailable, ordinary work may stop. Orders may be delayed, employees may lose access to schedules, and leaders may be unable to tell customers when service will resume. If sensitive information might have been accessed, the organization also faces questions about evidence, obligations, and communication.
A ransomware incident is therefore not solely an IT problem. IT may investigate affected systems and advise on containment and recovery, but other decisions belong across the organization:
- Leadership may need to set priorities and authorize significant commitments.
- Operations may need to determine which services must continue and which can pause.
- Communications may need to prepare accurate updates for employees and customers.
- External advisers may be needed to help the organization understand technical, legal, insurance, or other considerations.
In a small organization, one person may carry several of these responsibilities. The owner might also lead operations, while the IT manager may be the only person who understands the backup environment. Combining responsibilities is normal; assuming that one person can perform all of them at once is risky. The exercise will help the team see where demands overlap and where support or a clear decision process may be needed.
A note on the word recovery: it means more than getting computers to turn on again. A service is not necessarily ready for normal use simply because a system responds. People may need confidence that the information is usable, supporting systems are available, staff know the new procedures, and continuing issues can be monitored. Recovery also includes the work of communicating honestly, managing backlogs, and deciding when incident-specific coordination can end.
A tabletop exercise is a facilitated discussion of a hypothetical situation. A facilitator presents a scenario and introduces new information over time. Participants explain what they would do, who would be involved, and what they would need to know. An observer, if available, records decisions and points of confusion without trying to solve the scenario for the group.
Think of it as a rehearsal for coordination. The team does not have to prove that it can execute every technical task during the session. It does have to make its intentions specific enough to examine.
For example, “We would handle communications” sounds reassuring but leaves several questions unanswered. Who drafts the first message? Who approves it? Which employees need it? What can the organization say if the cause is still uncertain? A useful discussion turns a broad intention into an identifiable decision and a next step.
The facilitator may pause the conversation at a timed decision point and ask the team to state its choice using the information currently available. The time limit is not intended to imitate the exact pace of a real incident. It creates a manageable constraint: participants must move beyond collecting questions and decide what they would do next.
As the scenario develops, later information may change an earlier choice. That is not a failure. In an actual incident, a reasonable decision can need revision when the facts change. The important questions are whether the team recognized its uncertainty, assigned someone to pursue missing information, and revisited the decision when appropriate.
A tabletop also makes room for disagreement. An operations leader may want to maintain service; an IT manager may be concerned about further disruption; a communications lead may need an approved message before employees begin answering customer questions. Each perspective can be legitimate. The exercise gives the team a way to surface those tensions without blaming the people who raise them.
The scenario…