Read a sample: 1. The Storm and the Decision to Leave
By the morning of Sunday, August 28, 2005, the decision facing people in New Orleans had acquired a new urgency. Hurricane Katrina was moving through the Gulf of Mexico, and forecasts placed southeastern Louisiana in grave danger. Mayor Ray Nagin announced a mandatory evacuation of the city. Across the region, officials were issuing orders, opening roads to outbound traffic, and urging residents to get away from the coast.
The instruction sounded direct: leave. Carrying it out could require a car, a driver, fuel, money, a destination, and enough time to assemble the people and supplies that had to travel together. For some residents, those arrangements were already in motion. Others were still trying to make them.
Katrina’s approach exposed a distinction central to this book. The hurricane presented a physical threat that meteorologists could observe and forecast with increasing confidence. The opportunity to move out of its path was distributed through households, workplaces, vehicles, care arrangements, and public systems. A warning could reach a neighborhood without giving every person in it the same route out.
Understanding that difference begins before landfall, with a storm whose path and strength changed as it approached the Gulf Coast.
Katrina formed in late August over the Atlantic basin. As the National Hurricane Center’s post-storm report recounts, the system became a tropical depression near the Bahamas on August 23 and a tropical storm the following day. It strengthened into a hurricane before crossing South Florida on August 25.
Florida was not an inconsequential stop on the way to another disaster. Katrina brought damaging winds, heavy rain, flooding, and deaths there. After crossing the peninsula, the storm entered the Gulf of Mexico, where it intensified over warm water and became a much larger threat to the northern Gulf Coast.
The forecast track evolved as forecasters incorporated new observations and model guidance. A hurricane’s future path is not a line that can be read with perfect precision days in advance. Small changes in direction can shift the location of the strongest winds and storm surge, and forecasts of intensity are uncertain as well. Those uncertainties mattered to people deciding whether and when to travel. They did not mean that the danger was merely speculative.
By Saturday, August 27, the National Hurricane Center was warning that Katrina could strike the northern Gulf Coast as a major hurricane. A hurricane watch was issued for a stretch of the coast that included the New Orleans area. The watch indicated that hurricane conditions were possible; subsequent warnings signaled that those conditions were expected.
The forecasts also described hazards that extended beyond the storm’s center. Hurricane-force winds could damage buildings and interrupt power. Heavy rain could flood streets and neighborhoods. Storm surge—the abnormal rise of water driven toward shore by a storm—could push water into coastal communities, bays, and waterways. Where the water went depended on the shape of the coast, the direction of the wind, the storm’s size, and the performance of protective structures.
New Orleans faced a distinctive combination of these hazards. Parts of the city lay below sea level, and its surroundings included the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, canals, wetlands, and developed land. Levees, floodwalls, gates, and pumps reduced exposure to some flooding, but they did not make the city immune to a severe storm. Their effectiveness depended on their design, condition, and the forces they encountered.
A forecast therefore had to be understood on more than one scale. The probable track suggested where the hurricane might go. The larger field of wind, rain, and surge indicated how far its effects could reach. For a city dependent on roads crossing waterways and low-lying terrain, the usable time for an evacuation could end before the storm’s center arrived.
The weekend brought a rapid shift from preparation to departure. On Saturday, August 27, officials in New Orleans called for a voluntary evacuation. Other jurisdictions in southeastern Louisiana also took action as forecasts sharpened, though the timing and terms of orders varied by parish. Residents did not all receive the same instruction at the same moment.
The distinction between voluntary and mandatory evacuation carried practical as well as official meaning. A voluntary call urged people to leave while allowing them to weigh their own circumstances. A mandatory order communicated a more urgent public judgment that people should not remain. Neither phrase, by itself, supplied transportation or settled where a household would go.
As Katrina intensified in the Gulf, preparations accelerated. Louisiana officials activated a contraflow plan, reversing lanes on designated highways so that traffic that would normally travel toward the New Orleans area could instead move away from it. Contraflow was intended to increase outbound road capacity. It was a major logistical undertaking involving traffic control, coordination among agencies, and planned routes.
For drivers who could reach those routes, the extra lanes could make a large-scale departure more workable. Contraflow did not remove congestion or guarantee a quick trip, and it was not a transportation service for people without vehicles. Its benefits depended on access to a car or another ride and on the ability to join the outbound flow.
On Sunday morning, August 28, the National Hurricane Center reported Katrina as a Category 5 hurricane. Later that morning, Mayor Nagin announced the city’s mandatory evacuation. The order came after many residents had already left, while others were preparing to go, looking for transportation, or weighing circumstances that made departure difficult.
Warnings…